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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
By

this

appeal,

Rocky

Mountain

Claim

Staking

("Rocky

Mountain") seeks reversal of the District Court's Order vacating a
Colorado default judgment against William Frandsen ("Frandsen")
that was properly registered in Utah.

In its appellate brief,

Rocky Mountain demonstrated that Frandsen purposely established
minimum contacts with the State of Colorado, such that he should
have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Colorado to
respond to claims arising out of his contacts with Colorado.
Frandsen's purposeful contacts with Colorado included the
following:

(1) initiation of several telephone calls to Rocky

Mountain in Colorado to conduct business discussions and solicit
the performance of services by Rocky Mountain; (2) negotiation and
entry into an agreement with Rocky Mountain during a telephone
conversation

Frandsen

placed

to Colorado;

(3) execution and

transmittal to Colorado of a negotiable instrument, a check, to be
negotiated in Colorado; (4) initiation of a telephone call to
jlorado to direct the completion of the negotiable instrument and
its negotiation there; and (5) engaging in conduct that proximately
caused injurious effects in Colorado by failing to ensure payment
of the check sent to Colorado for negotiation.

In short, Rocky

Mountain demonstrated that Colorado's jurisdiction over Frandsen
was consistent with due process because he purposely availed
1

himself

of

the privilege

and benefits

of doing

business

in

Colorado.
In an attempt to avoid the Colorado judgment, Frandsen ignores
material facts and argues inconsistent positions.

In addition,

without analyzing the significance of his purposeful contacts with
Colorado, Frandsen asserts that the Colorado court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction over him violates due process. As set forth
in the Brief of Appellant and below, these positions are without
merit.

Frandsen engaged in substantial, purposeful contacts with

Colorado and, as such, the Colorado court properly exercised
personal jurisdiction over him.
ARGUMENT
X.

FRANDSEN HAS IGNORED MATERIAL FACTS THAT ESTABLISH PERSONAL
JURISDICTION IN COLORADO AND HAS TAKEN INCONSISTENT POSITIONS
CONCERNING HIS SELECTIVE VERSION OF THE FACTS,
Frandsenf

"as the judgment debtor seeking avoidance of the

judgment, . . . [has the burden to overcome the] presumption of
jurisdiction.M

See Data Management Sys., Inc. v. EDP Corp.. 709

P.2d 377, 380 (Utah 1985).

Although Frandsen admits that the

"Court must examine all of the facts and circumstances relative to
Mr.

Frandsen's

contacts with

Colorado,"

Frandsen

argues

for

affirmance of the District Court's erroneous Order based upon a
selectively incomplete version of the facts.
p. 10.)

2

(Brief of Appellee,

But all of the facts and circumstances
Frandsen's

contacts

with

Colorado

relative to Mr.

demonstrate

that

Frandsen

purposely availed himself of the privilege and benefit of doing
business in Colorado.
Jurisdiction over Frandsen was asserted pursuant to Colorado's
long-arm statute. Despite Frandsen's contentions to the contrary,
the Utah Supreme Court has stated expressly in Data Management
Systems, Inc. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 377 (Utah 1985) that the
appropriate

inquiry

is whether or not the exercise

jurisdiction was proper under Colorado law.

of such

"The appropriate

inquiry is whether service upon and the exercise of jurisdiction
over [the defendant] in the [sister state] court was valid under
fthe sister state's! laws.

Id. at 380 (emphasis added) .

The

Colorado statute provides that the following activities subject an
individual to the jurisdiction of the Colorado courts:
(a)

The transaction of any business within the state;

(b)

The commission of a tortious act within the state.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124.
Frandsen has not disputed that he engaged in acts delineated
by the Colorado long-arm statute.1 Instead, Frandsen contends that
1

Frandsen ignores the consequences of his contacts with
Colorado and the obvious injury caused there. In fact, nowhere in
hi brief does Frandsen deny his transmission to Colorado of a bad
ch- ::k and breach of his agreement to pay Rocky Mountain for the
ser/ices provided.

3

his contacts with Colorado were "[in]sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the due procedss [sic] clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution."

(Brief of Appellee,

p. 10.) Moreover, as he must, Frandsen concedes that Colorado may
exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent "permitted by the
due process clause."

(Id. at 11 (citing Bradford v. Naale, 763

P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1980)).)

However, Frandsen then asks this

Court to engage in a personal jurisdiction analysis based upon only
part of the story and ignoring most of the pertinent facts.
Contrary to the undisputed facts presented to the District
Court, Frandsen would have this Court believe that Rocky Mountain's
claim "arises out of a conversation which took place in Salt Lake
City . . . ."
misstatement

(Brief of Appellee, p. 5.) According to Frandsen's
of the

facts, Rocky Mountain's president, David

Waldner, appears out of nowhere in Frandsen's office in Salt Lake
City in February or March of 1991. Frandsen advises Waldner that
he has no funds to pay for staking of the Idaho properties.

(Id..

at 6.)
But

for

the

material

facts

omitted

by

Frandsen,

this

mysterious appearance would make no sense. However, as the record
before the District Court indicates, prior to this visit, Frandsen
initiated a call to Waldner at his office in Boulder, Colorado, to
request

that

Rocky Mountain perform necessary claims
4

staking

services on a group of Frandsen's unpatented mining claims in
Idaho.

(R. 62-63.)

During this telephone conversation, Waldner

and Frandsen enter into an agreement that Rocky Mountain would
perform

certain

work

at

Frandsen's

request.

(Id.)

Yet,

conspicuously absent from Frandsen#s brief is any mention of this
initial purposeful contact with Colorado or the oral agreement
Frandsen

made

there

for

the

claim

staking

services

which

subsequently led to the Colorado judgment. In fact, nowhere in the
record below does Frandsen deny or contest in any way the fact of
this telephone conversation or its substance.
As demonstrated in the Brief of Appellant, the contract for
services between the parties was entered into in Colorado.

See,

e.g. . 1 Corbin on Contracts, § 7 9 , p. 342; First Nat'l Bank of
Beaver Oklahoma v. Hough. 643 F.2d 705, 706 (10th Cir. 1981).
Moreover, the evidence of Frandsen's initiation of contacts with
Rocky Mountain in Colorado and entry into the agreement there are
uncontroverted.

Indeed, Frandsen has not argued that his initial

solicitation of Rocky Mountain did not result in a contract made in
Colorado.
Instead, Frandsen merely asserts, without any factual or legal
support whatsoever, that "[t]he contract for staking services was
made in Utah."

(Brief of Appellee, p. 13.)

But this bald

assertion is directly controverted by Frandsen's own brief.
5

Incredibly, after describing Waldner's visit to Utah, Frandsen then
states "the defendant did not contract with, authorize or agree to
pay the plaintiff to stake any of Idaho mining claims."
6.)

(Jd. at

Thus, Frandsen's assertion concerning the place of the

agreement not only ignores material facts, but is internally
inconsistent with his own statement that the Utah meeting did not
result in any agreement.
transmitting

Of course, Frandsen's later conduct in

the bad check to Colorado

for the

services he

originally solicited is also inconsistent with his position that a
contract did not exist. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that
a contract did exist and was entered into in Colorado.
Separate and apart from Frandsen's later acts directed toward
Colorado, the undisputed facts concerning the formation of the
relationship, ignored

by Frandsen, demonstrate

that

Frandsen

initiated contact with Rocky Mountain, contracted in Colorado and
then breached that contract causing injury in Colorado. Those acts
subject Frandsen to personal jurisdiction in Colorado.
II.

FRANDSEN#S NUMEROUS ACTS DIRECTED TOWARD COLORADO SATISFY DUE
PROCESS.
Frandsen concedes that "[i]n determining whether or not the

exercise of jurisdiction by a Court offends the due process clause,
each case must be evaluated on its own specific facts."

(Brief of

Appellee, p. 11.) Yet, after having made this admission, Frandsen
fails to conduct any real analysis of the totality of the facts of
6

this case and relies upon two archaic decisions from the dark ages
of personal jurisdiction, which are inapplicable here.
As noted above, Frandsen initiated and solicited the services
from Rocky Mountain in Colorado.

(R. 62-63) After the requested

services were performed, Rocky Mountain, a Colorado

company,

invoiced Frandsen. (R. 63) In response, Frandsen placed telephone
calls

and sent

a negotiable

instrument

to Colorado.

(Id.)

Subsequently, Frandsen specifically directed the completion of the
instrument and its negotiation, knowing there were no funds or
deposits sufficient to pay the check.

(R. 64)

Frandsenfs acts

were expressly aimed at Colorado.
M

[W]hen [a nonresident defendant's] intentional actions are

expressly aimed at the forum state, and the [defendant] knows that
the brunt of the injury will be felt by a particular resident in
the forum, the [defendant] must reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there to answer for its . . . actions."

Romney v. St.

John Virgin Grand Villas Associates, 734 F. Supp. 957, 962 (D. Utah
1990) (citing the United States Supreme Court's effects rule from
Calder v. Jones. 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984)). Frandsen's failure
to even respond to this argument is a tacit admission that it alone
is sufficient to sustain Colorado's jurisdiction over Frandsen.
Moreover, because Frandsen's contacts with Colorado resulted from
his own affirmative acts which created a substantial connection
7

with the forum state, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Frandsen in Colorado is particularly appropriate. See Burger King
v. Rudzewicz. 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
Further, Frandsen's reliance upon Cate Rental Co. v. Whalen &
Co. , 549 P.2d 707 (Utah 1976) is misplaced.
later rejected

That case applied the

"doing business" test to determine due process

compliance in the exercise of jurisdiction. As was later explained
in Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d 850 (Utah
1978), the proper test even in Utah is the "minimum contacts" test.
As a result, the viability of cases such as Cate Rental has been
questioned by the Utah Supreme Court in Mallory Engineering v. Ted
R. Brown & Assoc.. 618 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Utah 1980) and the United
States District Court for the District of Utah in Nova Mud Corp. v.
Fletcher, 648 F. Supp. 1123, 1125 (D. Utah 1986).
Frandsen

in his brief

Significantly,

failed to advise this Court of those

decisions.
Likewise, Frandsen's reliance on Safari Outfitters, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 448 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1968) is also misplaced.

In

Safari Outfitters. plaintiff attempted to have the Colorado court
exercise jurisdiction over an Illinois corporation because, among
other things, plaintiff had sent a check from Colorado to Illinois.
The court refused.

That scenario is the exact opposite of the

8

present case, where the Defendant, Frandsen, sent the bad check to
Colorado, where jurisdiction was properly exercised.
Similarly, the decision in Ruggieri v. General Well Service,
Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525 (D. Colo. 1982) does not support Frandsen's
position.

In

Ruggieri,

the

court

that

affirmative

misrepresentations made to the plaintiff inducing

justifiable

reliance upon him in Colorado and

held

causing damages in Colorado

subjected the defendant to jurisdiction in Colorado.
court

While the

found jurisdiction for the contract claim lacking, the

defendant

in Ruggieri did not send a bad check to Colorado

intending that it be negotiated there, as did Frandsen.
In the final analysis, based upon all of the relevant facts
surrounding the relationship between the parties concerning this
transaction, the Court must determine whether a sufficient nexus
exists between Frandsen and Colorado to satisfy due process.

As

noted in Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co., Inc., 815 P.2d 245, 249 (Utah
App. 1991), "[i]n undertaking interstate business [the defendants]
must recognize and accommodate . . . the probability and necessity
of litigating in foreign forums."

(Citing Mallory Eng'g v. Ted R.

Brown & Assoc.. 618 P.2d 1004, 1009 (Utah 1980)).
Colorado has consistently upheld its interest in adjudicating
disputes involving negotiable instruments sent to Colorado for
negotiation and payment.

Colorado has provided specific remedies

9

for its residents, such as Rocky Mountain, who are the victims of
bad checks.

Indeed, Colorado has adopted legislation to protect

its residents from injury caused by bad checks.

When Frandsen

directed the completion and negotiation of that instrument in
Colorado, knowing

that

it could

not then be paid,

Frandsen

certainly should have foreseen that he could be haled into a
Colorado court to answer for the consequences of his actions.
Therefore, it would be unjust to allow Frandsen to avoid liability
for his purposeful acts that caused injury in Colorado when
Frandsen had sufficient contacts with Colorado.
CONCLUSION
The Colorado court properly exercised personal jurisdiction
over Frandsen. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the District
Court's Order vacating the judgment.
DATED:

December g*3 * 1993.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

fhomas R. Karrenberg
Scott A. Call
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